I estimate the real effects of credit access among low-income households by exploiting geographic and temporal variation in the availability of payday loans. The empirical design isolates variation in loan access that is uninfluenced by store location decisions and state regulatory decisions, two factors that might otherwise correlate with economic hardship measures. I find no evidence that payday loans alleviate hardship. On the contrary, I find that loan access leads to increased incidence of difficulty paying mortgage, rent and utilities bills; moving out of one"s home due to financial troubles; and delaying needed medical care, dental care and prescription drug purchases. Through further analysis of differences in loan access -over time and across income groups -I rule out a number of alternative explanations for the estimated effects.
Introduction
Historically, consumer lending markets have been highly regulated, subject to state-imposed usury and small loan laws that limit loan interest rates and principal amounts, among other terms and conditions. For high credit-risk individuals, whose equilibrium interest rates are quite high, interest rate caps are often binding. An important question to consider in this context is whether improving access to credit, for example by raising or removing interest rate caps, alleviates economic hardship among borrowers. 1 Economic theory does not offer an unambiguous answer to this question. Improved access to credit can ease financial distress by allowing individuals to better smooth income or consumption shocks. It can also exacerbate hardship among individuals who, due to misinformation or self-control problems, borrow to increase current consumption and then face reduced financial flexibility due to a large, ongoing debt service burden (Laibson 1997; Bond, Musto and Yilmaz 2005) .
In this paper, I make use of the emergence and development of the payday lending industry, which provides short-term consumer loans at high interest rates, to study this issue empirically. Specifically, I exploit geographic and temporal variation in the availability of payday loans in order to estimate the effects of loan access on the following aspects of economic hardship: delay of needed health care due to lack of money; difficulty paying mortgage, rent and utilities bills; household food insecurity; going without telephone service; and moving out of one"s home due to financial difficulties. These measures constitute a fairly broad selection of outcomes on which we might observe the effects of borrowing on financial distress. Importantly, it is also plausible that a fairly small, short term loan can directly influence the likelihood of these events.
This investigation is complicated by the fact that variation in loan access is influenced by the location decisions of households and lending outlets, as well as the regulatory decisions of state legislators, who oversee these businesses. The latter two decisions, on the part of store operators and legislators, are likely made in response to the characteristics of potential borrowers. Additionally, payday lending regulations are 1 Usury laws and their effects are discussed in Benmelech and Moskowitz (2007) . 2 unlikely to be independent of state-level policies impacting welfare programs and health care coverage for poor populations, which exert an independent influence on many outcomes of interest. These considerations suggest that straightforward analyses of outcomes relative to store presence or proximity will fail to measure the causal impact of borrowing.
To surmount these issues, I utilize an empirical design that isolates variation in loan access that is independent of store location decisions and state-level policy decisions. First, I focus the analysis on households within states that prohibit payday loans. These households cannot obtain payday advances without leaving their home state.
2 Individuals living near a state that allows payday lending, however, can cross the border to obtain a loan. Conversely, individuals within the same state but sufficiently far from the border have limited, or more costly, access. With these circumstances in mind, I
use distance to the border of the nearest payday-allowing state to define loan access.
Store location decisions and home-state regulations play no role in generating the identifying variation in this measure; access to loans varies entirely due to household location decisions as well as the regulatory decisions of bordering states.
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There is considerable anecdotal evidence documenting the practice of individuals crossing into payday-allowing states to obtain loans. 4 Using geographic data on payday loan store locations that I compiled from state regulators, I offer further support for this view. I show that, conditional on zip code-level observables and a general effect of border proximity, the number of store locations is almost 20 percent higher in zip codes close to payday-prohibiting states. Furthermore, I show that this effect is stronger in areas where there are more potential payday loan customers across the border. This evidence 3 suggests that there is substantial additional loan demand from residents of paydayprohibiting states.
In the main analysis, I find no evidence that payday loan access mitigates financial distress along the dimensions that I observe. In fact, I find that loan access leads to important real costs, as reflected in increased likelihood of difficulty paying bills, moving out of one"s home due to financial difficulties, and delaying needed medical care, dental care and prescription drug purchases. The magnitudes of these effects are considerable. I estimate that among families with $15,000 to $50,000 in annual income, loan access increases the incidence of difficulty paying bills by 25 percent and moving out of one"s home by 60 percent. I also find that among adults in these families, loan access increases the delay of needed medical care, dental care and prescription drug purchases by roughly 25 percent.
These estimates are robust to the inclusion of extensive individual-level and county-level controls. Both sets of controls are important in confirming that the estimated effects are not driven by differences between sampled individuals or geographic areas that are unrelated to loan access. I also address the possibility that loan access, as I define it, captures a general border effect. Because I observe households near state borders without differential access to payday stores, I am able to separately identify a border effect. The estimated coefficients on loan access in such specifications remain positive, with magnitudes that are generally larger than in specifications without a border control.
In further analysis, I isolate temporal change in loan access within a difference-indifference model that includes county fixed effects. The resulting variation in loan access, which derives from changes in the availability of payday loans in bordering states, allows me to assess whether the main findings are influenced by omitted cross-sectional variables. For example, in the cross-section loan access might correlate with the availability of other goods and services across state borders, or with county-level characteristics that influence household location decisions. Omitted variables of this type do not seem to be an issue, as the difference-in-difference results generally confirm the sign and magnitude of the main findings, albeit with less inferential weight.
I also investigate the possibility that differences in county-level financial safety net and welfare services are driving the estimated effect of loan access. In particular, I 4 estimate a model that permits inclusion of county-year fixed effects by isolating withincounty variation in loan access among individuals in different income groups.
Specifically, I identify the effect of loan access by comparing the outcomes of individuals in the $15,000 to $50,000 income group, who represent the vast majority of payday borrowers, to outcomes of individuals in the below $15,000 income group, who are largely screened out of the payday loan market. Since financial safety net and welfare services likely have larger effects on the outcomes of poorer populations, an analysis of differences in outcomes across income groups should be free of this potential source of bias. Results from this model support the conclusion that payday loan access increases the likelihood of difficulty paying bills and moving out of one"s home due to those difficulties, but show little effect of loan access on health-related hardship.
Finally, I investigate whether the effects of loan access are stronger in counties where a greater proportion of workers commute to payday-allowing states. Individuals who regularly commute to a payday-allowing area face a lower cost of accessing loans.
We would expect loan access to have larger effects in counties with a greater proportion of such commuters, even after conditioning on proximity to a payday-allowing state. In this analysis, I find that the effects of loan access on difficulty paying bills and the other non-health related hardship are indeed larger in areas with more commuters. Loan access effects for the health-related outcomes, on the other hand, are not concentrated in areas with greater commuting flow.
The following points are important to consider when interpreting the results. First, while I do not observe actual borrowing, one can view the coefficients on loan access as reduced form estimates of the impact of borrowing, where geographic access serves as an instrument variable for borrowing. In the interpretation of the results, I discuss this issue further and consider the implied effects of borrowing. Second, since payday loans facilitate the exchange of future for current consumption, one expects the contemporaneous, or short-term, effects of a change in loan access to differ from the medium-to long-term effects. Because payday loans are short term in duration, and the outcomes are measured over year-long periods, my interpretation is that the coefficients reflect the current benefits entailed by borrowing as well as the future costs incurred for debt service and repayment. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I outlines in more depth some theoretical considerations on the effects of consumer borrowing. Section II provides background on the payday lending industry and its customer base. Sections III through V cover the data and empirical results. Finally, sections VI and VII offer further interpretation of the results and concluding thoughts.
I. Theories on Consumer Borrowing

A. Borrowing to Smooth Current Income or Consumption Shocks
Underlying the idea that credit access alleviates hardship is the basic insight that individuals benefit from having expanded options as they manage their consumption over time. If an otherwise credit-constrained household can borrow, at least for a short period, it can potentially smooth expenditures around periods of income or consumption shocks, which in the absence of borrowing would lead to adverse events like eviction and forgone health care. Under such difficult circumstances, individuals might rationally value current consumption quite highly compared to future consumption, and therefore benefit from borrowing in spite of high interest rates. 5 In light of this consideration, it is natural to test 6 the hypothesis that access to payday loans reduces the likelihood of the negative outcomes under consideration.
B. Borrowing by Consumers with Self-Control Problems
While loans provide flexibility in managing current consumption, they can also impose a substantial debt service burden. Such a reduction in future disposable income can place an individual at higher risk of hardship. Individuals who place a high value on current consumption relative to future consumption might choose to borrow, even when doing so raises the likelihood of future financial distress. 6 For example, consumers who suffer from self-control problems, as modeled through time inconsistent, hyperbolic preferences, will choose to borrow even when doing so makes them worse off (Laibson 1997) . In such a model, individuals borrow and plan to repay the loan in one period. They fail to execute this plan, however, and pay interest over many periods. Alternatively, individuals who overestimate their future employment prospects might face a large interest burden on loans that are taken out in anticipation of income growth that does not materialize. Though I cannot distinguish and test among the particular theories that predict this type of behavior, I can test their common implication, namely that payday loan access can increase the likelihood of the adverse outcomes under consideration.
II. Payday Lending Background
Payday advance loans offer a short term source of liquidity to a low-to moderateincome customer base. Loans typically have terms of two to four weeks, principal balances of $200 to $1000 and fees of $15 to $20 per $100 principal balance. The standard underwriting practice in the industry is to require identification, a recent bank account statement, a recent pay stub (or verification of other income), and a personal check that is post-dated to coincide with loan maturity. 7 Renewal and roll-over of loans is 7 common; in practice, payday advances constitute a longer source of liquidity than the two to four week loan duration implies.
Payday borrowers are not destitute, as very poor individuals generally fail to meet the bank account ownership and employment requirements of lenders. In surveys of payday borrowers, the vast majority of respondents report family income between $15,000 and $50,000, while only seven percent of borrowers report family incomes below $15,000. 
III. Data and Outcome Measures
A. Data
The primary outcome and control variables for this analysis are sourced from the Urban Institute"s National Survey of America"s Families (NSAF), a household survey designed to assess the well-being of non-elderly adults and children, particularly among low-income populations. The Urban Institute"s purpose in collecting this data was to facilitate the study welfare programs targeting the poor, particularly as fiscal responsibility for such programs transferred from federal to state government in 1996.
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In total, the NSAF data constitute a repeated cross-section of roughly 42,000 households per year during 1997, 1999 and 2002. 12 The data are nationally representative, and are also representative at the state level for 13 selected "focal states". 13 The NSAF"s coverage of economic hardship among low-income individuals makes it particularly useful in the context of my study. Furthermore, the survey"s inclusion of county-level geographic identifiers facilitates the measurement of household location relative to state borders and payday loan store locations. 
C. Regression Sample, Economic Hardship Analysis
In the main analysis, the regression sample includes observations from the NSAF"s 13 focal states in all three survey years. Three of the 13 focal statesMassachusetts, New Jersey and New York -prohibited payday lending during this time.
Only observations from these three states contribute directly to the identification of the coefficient on PaydayAccess. Observations from the other 10 focal states, in which loans were allowed, are assigned PaydayAccess of 1 for all three survey years. Since all models include state-year fixed effects, these observations do not contribute directly to the identification of PaydayAccess coefficients, but are included to improve precision in the estimation of county-level and individual-level covariates.
In an attempt to limit the analysis to the population that uses payday loans, I
stratify the sample by family income. I limit the regression sample to individuals in the low-to moderate-income range of $15,000 to $50,000, which captures the vast majority of borrowers. 18 In a falsification exercise, I also estimate the effect of loan access on individuals outside of this income range.
The summary statistics of the regression sample, limited to individuals in paydayprohibiting states and stratified by PaydayAccess, are displayed in Table 3. Treatment 13 and control groups differ. At the county level, areas with payday loan access are higher income, more populous and more urban. As measured in the person-level regression sample, individuals with payday loan access have, on average, higher family incomes, higher asset ownership (home and car), more education, and higher rates of health insurance. Demographically, they are more likely to be white, and less likely to be foreign born, African-American or Hispanic. These differences highlight the need to include county-level and individual-level controls in various specifications of the regressions that follow. It is worth noting, however, that basic county-level observables explain a substantial portion of the individual-level differences. Specifically, conditioning on cubics in county median income, population and percent urban population dramatically reduces the individual-level differences. Nevertheless, some differences remain statistically significant. For example, individuals with loan access remain more likely to be white, less likely to be Hispanic and less likely to be foreign born. In a robustness exercise, I will explore the effect of these sample imbalances on estimation results by estimating regressions on sub-samples stratified by race and immigrant status.
D. Identification using Geographic and Temporal Variation in Payday Loan Access
The general regression model I estimate is of the following form:
Within this equation "i" indexes person or family, "j" indexes county and "t" indexes time. X and Z are vectors containing relevant household-level and county-level controls, respectively. 19 All specifications include state-year fixed effects. I also define the dummy variable Border, which is 1 if the individual"s county is within 25 miles of 19 Z contains the following 2000 Census measures at the county level: cubics in county median income, population and percent urban population; percent unemployment; percent home ownership; percent foreign born; and racial composition. In the family-level regressions, X contains: log family income, number of family members, age (average for adults), dummies for home ownership, car ownership, past year unemployment spell (any adult), race (all white, all African-American, all Hispanic, all Asian, mixed race), immigrant status (all foreign born?) and education (most educated adult: no high school degree, high school degree, college and/or graduate degree). In the person-level regressions, X contains: log family income, dummies for home ownership, car ownership, past year unemployment, past year health un-insurance spell, sex, marital status, race (white, African-American, Hispanic, Asian/other), immigrant status and education (no high school degree, high school degree, college and/or graduate degree).
any state border, and 0 otherwise. This control, which accounts for a general border effect, is included in the fully-controlled specification. The identifying variation in PaydayAccess in this model includes a cross-sectional component, determined jointly by variation in household location relative to state borders and variation in border-state regulations, as well as a time-series component, due to changes in border-state regulations over the sample period. A key assumption of this identification strategy is that individuals do not choose their location based on their access to payday loans, or based on characteristics that happen to be correlated with payday loan access after conditioning out observables.
D.1 Regression Results, Non-Health Outcomes
Since the outcomes of interest are low probability, binary events, I employ probit estimation in the main set of results. Estimation results for the non-health outcomes are presented in Table 4 , with control variables layered into the model as one moves from column (1) through column (4). In this table, I present point estimates, standard errors and average incremental effects for the parameter of interest, which is the coefficient on PaydayAccess, and suppress estimation results for other covariates in the model.
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The specification in column ( for a specification using all previously discussed control variables in addition to a border 
D.2 Regression Results, Health Outcomes
In Table 5 , I present the estimation results for the health outcomes. These results follow the same template as Table 4 , with increasing controls layered into the model as one moves from column (1) through column (4). Due to the nature of the NSAF survey design, the health outcomes are measured at the person level rather than the family level.
Because child heath utilization is likely to be quite different from adult utilization, I
restrict the sample to individuals greater than 18 years of age. Additionally, because the NSAF questionnaire for 1997 did not inquire about the reason for delayed health care (i.e., was delay due to lack of insurance or money), the four health outcomes of interest are undefined for 1997 data, and the regression sample is therefore limited to 1999 and 2002 data. Postponed rise slightly; the positive coefficient for the former is significant at the 10 percent level, while the coefficient for the latter is not quite significant.
Finally, results for the fully controlled specification are given in column (4). As in the case of the non-health outcomes, adding a border dummy to the model increases the estimated effect of loan access. PaydayAccess coefficients in this specification are positive and strongly significant for Any Care Postponed (4.5 percentage point effect)
and Drug Purchase Postponed (1.8 percentage point effect), and significant at the 10 percent level for Medical Care Postponed (1.3 percentage point effect) and Dental Care
Postponed (2.6 percentage point effect). 
D.3 Falsification Exercises
To further evaluate the model results, I perform three falsification exercises, which are presented in Table 6 . First, I offer further confirmation that the effect of loan access is not confounded with an effect due to state border proximity. I estimate the coefficient on a border dummy (county within 25 miles of a border) in the sample of payday-allowing states, which excludes observations from Massachusetts, New Jersey and New York. Results are reported in column (1) of Panels A and B. Point estimates for the Border coefficient are generally negative, and are in no instances positive and significant, indicating that the positive effects of loan access are likely not border related.
In justifying the choice of a regression sample stratified by income, I
hypothesized that geographic access to payday loans ought to have no effect on the outcomes of two groups: very low-income individuals who do not qualify for loans, and moderate-to high-income individuals who have access to cheaper sources of credit. I find support for this hypothesis among both sets of outcomes, as the results in column (2) Postponed (significant at the 5% level) and Any Care Postponed (significant at the 10% level), and small, statistically insignificant PaydayBorder coefficients for Medical Care
Postponed and Drug Purchase Postponed. The positive finding on postponement of dental care raises the concern that for this outcome, there is some unobserved factor causing postponement of care that is unrelated to loan access. On the whole, however, this exercise does not show signs of systematically higher levels of hardship in PaydayBorder areas. In the next section, I will attempt to address this concern more formally.
E. Identification using Temporal Variation in Payday Loan Access
To further address the problem of confounding variation at the county level, I
isolate temporal variation in PaydayAccess by estimating the following difference-indifference model. 
E.1 Difference-in-Difference Results, Non-Health Outcomes
Difference-in-difference results for the non-health outcomes are given in Table 7 Because temporal variation in payday loan access is fairly limited, inferences are somewhat weaker compared to the main specification. Overall, the results provide modest confirmation that PaydayAccess increases the likelihood of the non-health outcomes, as found in the main specification.
E.2 Difference-in-Difference Results, Health Outcomes
To estimate difference-in-difference specifications for the health variables, I must slightly alter the outcome measures and incorporate the 1997 data. 24 Since I do not know the reason for postponement of health care in the 1997 data, I redefine each variable based on whether or not care was postponed or foregone, regardless of the reason.
Difference-in-difference results for the altered health measures (denoted with asterisks) are given in percentage points) is quite similar to the finding in the main specification.
F. Identification using Variation in Payday Loan Access across Family Income Groups
An important concern to address is the possibility that counties with loan access, as defined by PaydayAccess, might differ in the provision of safety net and welfare services to low-income groups, as compared to counties without access. Since control variables that measure these differences are lacking, I explore a further identification strategy that permits simultaneous estimation of the loan access effect with county-year fixed effects. As discussed earlier, use of payday loans is quite limited among individuals with family incomes below $15,000, as individuals without bank accounts and steady employment are screened out of the market. Therefore, I propose isolating variation in loan access between those with incomes of $15,000 to $50,000 and those with incomes below $15,000. An attractive feature of this model is that the financial safety net and welfare services that might influence the dependent variables of interest would likely have larger effects on poorer populations. To the extent that PaydayAccess correlates with differences in these services, isolating variation in loan access across income groups should eliminate this potential source of bias. PaydayAccess has the same definition and content as in the main specification, and the regression sample is restricted to individuals with less than $50,000 in family income.
Income15to50 is a dummy for the $15,000 to $50,000 family income category. The independent variable of interest is PaydayAccess* Income15to50, which isolates differences in loan access between those in the two income categories. Estimation results for this model are given in Table 8 , Panels A and B.
F.1 Results, Difference across Income Categories, Non-Health Outcomes
Results for the non-health outcomes are given in Panel A. The first specification includes county fixed effects, while the second specification includes county-year fixed effects. This change in specifications has little effect on the results. Therefore, I focus on the results, reported in column (2), from the version that includes county-year fixed effects. The effect of loan access is positive for each of the outcomes, but is strongest for Lack of precision in estimation suggests that the health-related results from this model are not very informative.
G. County Work Flow Interactions
I also test whether PaydayAccess effects depend on the proportion of workers that commute to work in nearby payday-allowing states. Since individuals that regularly commute to a payday-allowing area face a lower cost of accessing loans, we would expect loan access to have a larger effect in counties with a larger proportion of such commuters, even after conditioning on proximity to a payday-allowing area. Using county-to-county workflow data collected by the Census, I define Pct Workflow, the proportion of workers in a county that commute to a payday-allowing state. I then estimate the model: this estimate is not quite significant at the 10 percent level. These results suggest that improved access to payday loan stores -in this case measured along a dimension other than geographic proximity -leads to increased incidence of hardship. of these estimates are quite large, which cautions against drawing strong inferences from these results. Nevertheless, the failure to find the hypothesized effect for the healthrelated measures in this specification and the previous specification (differencing over income categories) is perhaps a sign that there is some health-related omitted variable that is driving positive PaydayAccess estimates in the main specification.
H. Further Robustness Checks
In Tables 10 and 11 In Table 11 , I repeat the same robustness checks for the health outcomes, with the exception of dropping the 1997 data, since the health-related analysis already excludes these observations. As with the non-health outcomes, the results from a linear probability specification are very similar to those of a probit specification. The weighted probit specification, reported in column (2), confirms the positive effect of PaydayAccess on
Any Care Postponed and also shows a significant effect on Dental Care Postponed.
Notably, regression weights reduce the PaydayAccess coefficient on Medical Care
Postponed, and reduce the precision of the PaydayAccess coefficient on Drug Purchase Postponed, rendering each statistically insignificant. In the specification using LogDistance, reported in column (3), I find negative point estimates, confirming that areas closer to payday-allowing states have higher postponement of needed health care.
In this specification, the only significant effects are on Any Care Postponed and Dental Care Postponed. Finally, the specification in column (4), using Pct Pop < 15 miles in place of PaydayAccess, confirms that loan access increases the likelihood of Any Care
Postponed and Medical Care Postponed.
H.1 Addressing Sample Imbalance
As a final robustness exercise, I investigate whether the estimated effects of loan access are driven by sample imbalance across treatment and control groups. Immigrant status and race are the two key dimensions along which average characteristics differ among individuals with and without loan access, even after controlling for basic county-27 level observables. To assess the impact of these differences I estimate the main regression model among sub-samples, splitting the sample by race and immigrant status; results are displayed in Table 12 
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VI. Discussion and Interpretation of Results
A. Treatment on the Treated
The incremental effects discussed previously represent averages across all individuals in the sample who have geographic access to loans. Average effects on the relevant "treated" population, i.e. those who borrow, are more relevant in evaluating the magnitude of the findings. A rough calculation, using detailed payday borrowing data from Oklahoma and Florida as well as census data on population and income, indicates that around 10 percent of individuals that meet the sample"s age and family income conditions borrow in these states. 26 Since the number of borrowers per family is likely less than the number of adults per family, the proportion of families that borrow should be somewhat higher, in the range of 15-20 percent. 27 Accordingly, person-level and family-level average effects must be multiplied by a factor of ten and six, respectively, to determine the average effect among borrowers.
In order for there to be sizable increases in the likelihood of hardship among borrowers, it must be the case that a substantial number of borrowers face large annual interest burdens. Payday loan usage data, displayed in Table 13 , attests to this fact.
Frequency of usage across borrowers is quite heterogeneous, with a substantial mass (around 25 percent) of borrowers using 1-2 loans per year, but also 30 percent of borrowers using at least 12 loans over the course of a year. Using an average transaction principal amount of $350 and fee of $50, we can put the annual debt service burden of borrowers in perspective. Under these assumptions, around 40 percent of borrowers face an annual interest burden of at least $500, while 10 percent of borrowers pay upwards of $1000 in interest annually. 
B. Reconciling with Previous Findings
Consistent with my results, Skiba and Tobacman (2006) 
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VII. Conclusion
In this study, I offer an empirical strategy for identifying causal effects of payday loan access on economic hardship. I do so by isolating variation in loan access that is independent of store location decisions and state payday loan regulations. I find evidence that payday borrowing has important real costs, reflected in an increased likelihood of a number of negative outcomes. Specifically, my findings strongly support the conclusion that loan access increases the likelihood of having difficulty paying bills. Loan access also appears to increase the likelihoods of moving out of one"s home due to financial difficulties, and delaying needed medical care, dental care and prescription drug purchases, though empirical support for these conclusions is somewhat weaker.
In future work, I plan to investigate the effect of payday loan access on the level and mix of consumption expenditures. To do so, I have gained access to non-public geographic identifiers in the Consumer Expenditure Survey, and plan to analyze the data with the same identification strategies as in this study.
Appendix on Payday Loan Regulations
Regulatory Environment in Massachusetts, New Jersey and New York
New For the large operators that constitute 40 percent of the industry -Ace Cash Express, Advanced America, Cash America, Check into Cash, Check "N Go, Money Mart and
Valued Services -there is no evidence on 10-K filings and company websites of stores operating in these three states.
Regulatory Environment in States Bordering Massachusetts, New Jersey and New York
Connecticut prohibited lending through a combination of a cap on check cashing fees (Conn. Agencies Reg. § 36a-585-1) and small loan interest rates (Conn. Gen. Stat. 
Person-Level Measures
Dental Care Postponed
Drug Purchase Postponed
Any Care Postponed -During the last 12 months, was there a time when you and your family were not able to pay your rent, mortgage, or utilities bills?
-During the last 12 months, you or your children move in with other people even for a little while because you could not afford to pay your mortgage, rent, or utilities bills?
-In the last 12 months, did you or other adults in your family ever cut the size of your meals or skip meals because there wasn't enough money for food?
-During the past 12 months, has your household ever been without telephone service for at least one month? (Do not include temporary loss of service due to storms, damaged wires, or phone company maintenance)
-Binary variable that takes the value of one if the family experiences any of the four forms of hardship described above, and zero otherwise.
Medical Care Postponed
-Binary variable formed from three health-care variables above.
-During the past 12 months did you not get or postpone getting dental care when you needed it? -Was lack of insurance or money a reason why you did not get the dental care you needed or was it some other reason?
-During the past 12 months did you not get or postpone getting medical care or surgery when you needed it? -Was lack of insurance or money a reason why you did not get the medical care or surgery you needed or was it some other reason?
-During the past 12 months did you not fill or postpone filling a prescription for drugs when you needed them? -Was lack of insurance or money a reason why you did not get the drugs you needed or was it some other reason? In column (1) are OLS estimation results for the regression of the number of payday loan stores in zip code i on a dummy for the proximity of the nearest payday-prohibiting state. In column (2), I test whether this effect is stronger where the bordering zip codes contain a higher proportion of households in the $15,000 to $50,000 income category, from which most payday loan users are drawn. Specifically, I interact the key coefficient of interest with the proportion of bordering zip codes' population in the $15,000 to $50,000 category. Included in both regressions are state fixed effects, a control for the proximity of any state border, and a set of zip code-level controls sourced from the 2000 Census. These controls are: cubics in median income, population and land area; the proportion of the population in five racial/ethnic categories and five education categories; and the proportion in the following categories: foreign born, unemployed, living in an urban area, living in poverty, owning a home and owning a home mortgage. , which is estimated on the sample of paydayallowing states. Column (2) regressions test for a null effect of PaydayAccess among those who are outside of the $15,000 to $50,000 family income range that ecompasses most payday borrowers. I report the PaydayAccess coefficient in:
, which is estimated on the pooled sample of observations with family income below $15,000 or above $50,000. Column (3) regressions test for a null effect of loan access in the time period before loans were available in the states bordering MA, NJ and NY. I report the PaydayBorder coefficient in: which is estimated on a sample that excludes the 1997 and 1999 survey years for MA observations, and the 2002 survey years for NY and NJ observations (when loans were available). In each regression cell, the average incremental effect is given in brackets, followed by the underlying probit coefficient, the probit coefficient standard error (in parentheses), the number of observations and a measure of model fit. In each specification, observations are grouped by county when calculating standard errors. Within each regression cell, I report the average incremental effect (in brackets), followed by the underlying probit coefficient, the probit coefficient standard error (in parentheses), the number of observations and a measure of model fit. In each specification, observations are grouped by county when calculating standard errors. . Columns (2) and (3) display probit estimates for the PaydayAccess coefficient in: The estimation sample in the column (2) specification excludes 1997 data, while column (3) is estimated using sampling weights. The specifications in columns (4) and (5) use alternative definitions of loan access. Column (4) evaluates LogDistance, the log distance between a family's county and the nearest payday-allowing state:
Border
. Column (5) evaluates Pct Pop < 15 miles, which, for each family, measures the percentage of their county's population living within 15 miles of a payday-allowing state (this percentage is calculated using the location and population of the census tracts that compose each county): Average incremental effects, where relevant, are given in brackets, followed by the underlyign probit (or OLS) coefficients and standard errors. Observations are grouped by county when calculating standard errors. Below are results from 16 separate regressions of health-related hardship on measures of loan access and controls. Column (1) displays OLS estimation results for the PaydayAccess coefficient in a linear probability model:
---------------------PaydayAccess---------------------LogDistance
. Column (2) displays probit estimates for the PaydayAccess coefficient in: , which is estimated using sampling weights. The specifications in columns (3) and (4) use alternative definitions of loan access. Column (3) evaluates LogDistance , the log distance between an individual's county and the nearest payday-allowing state:
. Column (4) evaluates Pct Pop < 15 miles , which, for each individual, measures the percentage of their county's population living within 15 miles of a payday-allowing state (this percentage is calculated using the locationand population of the census tracts that compose each county):
Average incremental effects, where relevant, are given in brackets, followed by the underlyign probit (or OLS) coefficients and standard errors. Observations are grouped by county when calculating standard errors. To investigate whether differences in racial and immigrant composition across treatment status are confounding the loan access effect, I estimate PaydayAccess coefficients within subsets of the main sample, and report the results of those 36 separate regressions below. The table is structured so that in each panel, the left hand side variables differ across block rows and the estimation sub-samples differ across columns. The specification in column (1) restricts the sample to US-born individuals, while the specifications in columns (2) through (4) restrict the sample to whites, african-americans and hispanics, respectively. All specifications include state by year fixed effects, county-level controls (Z), family-or individual-level controls (X) and a general border control. In each regression cell, I report the average incremental effect (in brackets), followed by the underlying probit coefficient, the probit coefficient standard error (in parentheses), the number of observations and a measure of model fit. 
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